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INTRODUCTION 
The proliferation of regional trade agreements (RTAs)
1 in the past fifty years has 
triggered  numerous  studies  in  various  disciplines,  law  being  one  of  them,  seeking  to 
explain why the process of bilateral and regional cooperation is accelerating and how this 
trend influences cooperation in multilateral trade. The prospect of closer political and 
economic integration and/or the need for national security, coupled with social, historical, 
cultural, and even linguistic ties among the nations of a particular region, are the reasons 
that  normally  prompt  countries  to  join  together.  Sharing  the  same  legal  culture  and 
history and having similar external economic policies could make it easier not only to 
reach an agreement on mutually beneficial trade actions but also to comply with such an 
agreement. In addition, the WTO’s lack of progress in multilateral trade negotiations has 
                                                 
* Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, UBC. This paper is a part of a large interdisciplinary research 
project on Regional Trade Agreements conducted by Professor Armand de Mestral, Faculty of Law, 
McGill University, as the principal investigator and funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities 
Research Council. The research is also partly funded by the Jean Monnet Module Grant awarded by the 
European Commission in 2005.  I am grateful to Hayane Dahmen, 2nd year LL.B student at the Faculty of 
Law, UBC, and the following M.A. students of the Institute for European Studies, UBC: Michael Eddy, 
Thorbern Dorn and Zsuzsana Suba. However, all errors and omissions are only my own. 
1 The term “regional trade agreement” in this article is used to include preferential trade agreements as well, 
including trade agreements between countries that are not within the same geographic region. The term 
“plurilateral” regional trade agreement is used to indicate that more than two countries are party to the 
agreement.    2 
prompted  many  countries  to  move  toward  regionalism  in  order  to  achieve  closer 
economic integration and benefit from trade liberalization.  
As the world economy becomes more integrated as a result of numerous rounds of 
trade negotiations under GATT and the WTO, various regions are also achieving a higher 
degree of integration, moving from “shallow” to “deep” integration, or from the reduction 
or elimination of trade barriers to the harmonization of laws and macroeconomic, and tax 
policies to the creation of economic or/and monetary unions with full internal mobility of 
people and capital.
2 Many of these regional agreements are bilateral agreements between 
developed and developing countries and it is noteworthy that all of the WTO members, 
except Mongolia, are involved in such integration.
3 About 50 per cent of world trade is 
currently managed under RTAs.
4 There are more than 300 in force, although not all of 
them are functioning fully and effectively or have been notified to the WTO. From its 
inception until September 15, 2006, the WTO has received notifications of 211 RTAs.
5 
More than 80% of the RTAs in force and notified to WTO are free trade agreements 
(FTAs) and only about 8% are customs unions.
6 Since the establishment of GATT, the 
                                                 
2 The trend towards deepening regional integration is usually seen as a transition from “old regionalism” to 
“new regionalism”. But see J-A. Crawford & R.V. Fiorentino, “The Changing Landscape of Regional 
Trade Agreements”, Discussion Paper no.8, WTO, 2005, at 3.  
3 See the WTO web site at http://www.wto.org. According to Jo-Ann Crawford and Roberto V. Fiorentino, 
RTAs are mostly bilateral (75% of all notified RTAs and 90% of those under negotiation) and rarely 
plurilateral. See J-A. Crawford & R.V. Fiorentino, ibid. at 4. 
4 See the WTO web site at http://www.wto.org.  
5 Available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/summary_e.xls (last accessed on November 
12, 2006. 
6 J-A. Crawford & R.V. Fiorentino, “The Changing Landscape of Regional Trade Agreements”, supra note 
2 at 3. Free trade agreements are bilateral or plurilateral agreements among states concluded to eliminate 
restrictions to trade by establishing mutual preferential treatment with regard to the trade in goods and/or 
services originating from the territories of the FTA’s member states. Some FTAs could include provisions 
related to investment, government procurement and competition. See S. Woolcock, “A Framework for 
Assessing RTAs: WTO-plus” in G. Sampson & S Woolcock, eds., Regionalism, Multilateralism and 
Economic Integration, The Recent Experience (Hong Kong: The United Nations University, 2003) 18.   3 
entity that has been most active in concluding and in notifying it of RTAs has been the 
European Union
7(EU).
8 The EU has concluded various forms of agreements with third 
countries, such as association agreements, partnership and trade agreements or simple 
trade agreements, depending of the level of integration that it intends to achieve with that 
country.
9  In  addition,  the  EU,  itself  a  unique  RTA,  has  emerged  as  one  of  the  most 
prominent  models  of  integration  for  other  countries  and  as  the  facilitator  of  regional 
economic integration among developing countries.
10 
As studies into the growth of RTAs have emerged, parallel studies have been 
conducted  into  the  agreements’  dispute  resolution  mechanisms  (DRMs)  in  order  to 
facilitate  a  better  understanding  of  compliance  with  the  norms  and  rules  of  the 
agreements,  to  categorize  them  and  to  analyze  their  decision  making  processes  and 
enforcement regimes as well as to hypothesize on the possibility of transplanting a DRM 
that works efficiently in a particular RTA into other RTAs. For example, Jackson has 
pointed out that, since the end of World War II and the development of international 
institutions, DRMs have been evolving from power-oriented to rule-oriented systems.
 11 
                                                 
7 In this article the terms European Union and European Community (EC) will be used interchangeably 
even thought the author acknowledges that they are usually used to indicate two different forms of 
actorness and that only the EC has an explicitly recognized legal personality. 
8 See the chart produced by the WTO on March 1, 2007 available online at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/status_e.xls (last accessed on April 15, 2007). 
 
9 E. R. Robles, “Political & Quasi-Adjudicative Dispute Settlement Models in European Union Free Trade 
Agreements”, WTO Economic and Research Statistics Division, Staff Working Paper ERSD-2006-09, 
November 2006 at 11.  
10 See the European Parliament Resolution on the Commission Communication on EC Support for 
Regional Economic Integration Efforts Among Developing Countries, 1997 O.J. (C132) 316. 
11 J. H. Jackson, The World Trading System, 2
nd ed., (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1997) at 110-111. In 
brief, non-adjudication based methods such as conciliation, negotiation, and mediation are usually called 
“diplomatic” means of peaceful settlement of disputes and are often perceived in international law as 
power-based DRMs. The power-based DRM addresses disputes through government-to-government 
negotiations and often results in a political settlement rather than in a determination based on the merits of   4 
Other authors claim that adjudication based methods, such as supranational courts and 
arbitral panels are becoming the main dispute resolution methods because they result in a 
binding decision that is imposed upon the parties to a dispute, while negotiation (and 
conciliation and mediation) merely suggest solutions that the parties are not bound to 
accept.
12  
In  addition  to  noting  the  current  proliferation  of  institutionalized  international 
tribunals and the increased acceptance of their compulsory jurisdiction, studies usually 
point out several important reasons for the dynamic development of international DRMs: 
“(1) the increased density, volume and complexity of international norms, which require 
correspondingly  sophisticated  dispute-settlement  institutions  to  guarantee  the  smooth 
operation of these norms and their accurate interpretation; (2) greater commitment to the 
rule of law in international relations, at the expense of power-oriented diplomacy; (3) the 
easing of international tensions, in particular transformation of socialist and centralized 
economies  into  market  economies;  and  (4)  the  positive  experience  with  some 
international courts and tribunals (e.g., the Court of Justice of the European Communities 
or the ECJ and the European Court of Human Rights or the ECHR)”.
13  
                                                                                                                                                 
the case. See R. Brewster, “Rule-Based Dispute Resolution in International Trade Law” (2006) 92 Va. L. 
Rev. 251 at 254-256. 
12 See M. A. R. Lemmo, “Study of Selected International Dispute Resolution Regimes, With an Analysis of 
the Decision s of the Court of Justice and the Andean Community” (2002) 19 Arizona J. Int’l L. 863 at 863. 
13 See Y. Shany, The Competing Jurisdictions of International Courts and Tribunals (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003) at 3-4 and G. W. Coombe, Jr., “The Resolution of Transnational Commercial 
Disputes: A Perspective From North America” (1999) 5 Ann. Surv. Int’l & Comp. L. 13. Coombe argues 
that the global political and economic change reflected in transition from socialism to capitalism or to some 
form of a market economy in many parts of the world (from Eastern Europe to the Pacific Asia and South 
America) is also leading to the expansion of the human rights and individual freedoms, the intensification 
of trade relations and the increasing complexity of international trade and should be credited for the 
development of DRMs and in particular an expansion in the use of adjudicative techniques in many non-
Western parts of the world.   5 
This article examines the development of the DRM in the Central European Free 
Trade Agreement (CEFTA), concluded in 1992 among the so-called Visegrád countries 
(Hungary,  Poland,  the  Czech  Republic  and  Slovakia).
14  The  EU’s  support  was 
instrumental in the creation of CEFTA and in the facilitation of the further economic 
integration of the region during the pre-accession process leading to the EU membership. 
The EU encouraged and inspired CEFTA, indirectly, by providing an institutional model 
for integration, and directly, by concluding special association agreements to establish 
free trade areas with CEFTA countries.  
Until the late 1990s, most of the association agreements concluded between the 
EU  and  third  countries  included  a  DRM  clause  based  on  political  dispute  settlement 
model preferred by the EU.
15 Since the late 1990s, however, starting with its FTA with 
Mexico
16, the EU has been negotiating RTAs with a more elaborate and juridicialized 
DRM clause. This new model was included, with some variations, in a number of FTAs 
that  the  EU  subsequently  concluded  with  third  countries,  and  it  inspired  the  most 
                                                 
14 Central European Free Trade Agreement (1995) 34  I.L.M. 8, signed in Krakow on 21 December 1992 
and entered into force on 1 March 1993. The term Visegrad group comes from the Visegrad Summit 
Declaration signed in February 1991 by Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. After Czechoslovakia split 
into two countries, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, the group became known as V4. The Visegrad group 
discussed similarities of their main political goals and concerns and the possibility of closer cooperation. 
See M Vachudova, “The Visegrad Four: No Alternative to Cooperation?” RFE/RL Research Report Vol. 2 
No. 34, August 27, 1993 at 38. 
15 I. G. Bercero, “Dispute Settlement in European Union Free Trade Agreements: Lesson Learned?” in L. 
Bartels & F. Ortino, Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO System (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2006) 383 at 383 and E. R. Robles, “Political & Quasi-Adjudicative Dispute Settlement Models in 
European Union Free Trade Agreements”, supra note 9 at 3.  
16 Economic Partnership, Political Co-operation and Co-operation Agreement (Global Agreement) signed 
in Brussels on 8 December 1997, entered into force on 1st October 2000 (O.J. L276 of 28 October 2000). 
Decision 2/2000 of the EU-Mexico Joint Council of 23 March 2000 (2000/415/EC) (OJ L 157, 30/6/2000 
p. 10-28) establishes a free trade area in goods, and Decision 2/2001 of the EU-Mexico Joint Council of 27 
February 2001 implementing Articles 6, 9, 12(2)(b) and 50 of the Economic Partnership, Political 
Coordination and Cooperation Agreement (2001/153/EC) (OJ L070, 12/3/2001 p. 7-50) establishes a free 
trade area in services.  
   6 
important  amendment  made  in  2006  to  CEFTA.  The  model  is  often  called  quasi-
adjudicative  because  it  involves  arbitration  in  addition  to  bilateral  consultations  and 
consultation within the joint committee or the joint council of the RTA.
17  
This  article  seeks  to  resolve  questions  about  the  effectiveness  of  the  DRMs 
utilized by the EU, and show how they relate to other international dispute resolution 
fora.  Also,  by  focusing  on  the  evolution  of  CEFTA’s  DRM,  it  examines  the 
transferability of a DRM that works successfully in one RTA into others. Prior to this 
analysis, a brief note will be made on the importance of DRMs. 
 
1. The Role of DRMs in the Development of International Law 
The  way  in  which  an  international  treaty  ensures  that  its  signatories  actually 
comply  with  their  treaty  obligations  is  one  of  the  critical  factors  determining  the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the treaty.
18  The classical arguments are that an efficient 
DRM  is  the  most  important  component  of  international  cooperation
19  and  that  it  is 
capable of reducing the number of economic and political disputes that could lead to 
military conflict.
20  In addition to this preventive value, DRMs are seen as an important 
                                                 
17 Since two recent FTAs concluded with Mexico and Chile in 2000 and 2001 introduced a quasi-judicial 
model of adjudication several authors argued that the EU is shifting towards juridicialization of DRMs. 
See, for example, I. G. Bercero, “Dispute Settlement in European Union Free Trade Agreements: Lesson 
Learned?”,  supra note 15 and E.R. Robles, “Political & Quasi-Adjudicative Dispute Settlement Models in 
European Union Free Trade Agreements”, supra note 9 at 3.  
18 Some compliance theories emphasize the importance of dispute resolution mechanisms (DRMs) and the 
establishment of international enforcement bodies. See A. Chayes & A. Handler Chayes, The New 
Sovereignty; Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1995) at 2-3. 
19 A. K. Schneider, “Getting Along: The Evolution of Dispute Resolution Regimes in International Trade 
Organizations” (1999) 20 Mich. J. Int’l L. 697 at 699. 
20 E.D. Mansfield & B.M. Pollins (eds.), Economic Interdependence and International Conflict: New 
Perspectives on an Enduring Debate (Ann Arbur: University of Michigan Press, 2003) at 222.   7 
tool to ensure an authoritative interpretation of the rules and norms of a treaty.
21 Thus, 
DRMs “contribute towards the convergence of globalized commercial law concepts.”
22 
Another important function of a well-tailored and efficient DRM that is independent, 
neutral and capable of producing a binding decision is to enhance the legitimacy of the 
international treaty and international organization to which it is aligned
23 and to “enhance 
the credibility of international commitments in specific multilateral contexts.”
24  
RTAs in general, and their DRM provisions in particular, are seen as a means by 
which developed countries to export their laws or transplant them into the other countries 
that are party to the RTA and that need legal reform.
25 For example, arbitration as the 
form of adjudication is often seen as a wagon for transportation of a developed country’s 
social and legal norms to developing countries, especially when the prospect of granting 
                                                 
21 A. Chayes & A. Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty, supra note 18 at 24.  
22 R. C. Wolf, Trade, Aid and Arbitrate; The Globalization of Western Law (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004) at 
35. 
23 F. J. Garcia, “New Frontiers in International Trade: Decisionmaking and Dispute Resolution in the Free 
Trade Area of the Americas: An Essay in Trade Governance” (1997) Mich. J. Int’l L. 357 at 365-367. 
Honorable Sir David Simmons also argues, relying on the Report of the 1992 Ramphal Commission that 
initiated the creation of the Caribbean Court of Justice in 2001, that the existence of an independent DRM 
is fundamental to the process of economic integration itself as it facilitates a deeper and wider integration 
by providing an institutional framework of regional jurisprudence to develop and increase access to justice 
by members of the RTA. See D. Simmons, “Caribbean Court of Justice: A Unique Institution of Caribbean 
Creativity” (2005) 29 Nova L. Rev. 171 at 177. 
24 L. Helfer & M.-A. Slaughter, “Why States Create International Tribunals: A Response to Professors 
Posner and Yoo” (2005) 93 Calif. L. Rev. 899 at 904 and 914. 
25 R.C. Wolf, Trade, Aid and Arbitrate; supra note 22 at 9-14. See also M.M. Baker, “No Country Left 
Behind; Exporting of U.S. Legal Norms Under the Guise of Economic Integration” (2005) 19 Emory Int’l 
L. Rev. 1321 at 1324. Baker argues that the United States is using its enormous economic power over the 
other parties to impose its norms, rules and interpretations on the Central American Free Trade Agreement 
(CAFTA), whose other party governments are likely to accept the foreign standards, particularly if their 
own systems have none. In his view, the fact that those countries need legal reform facilitates the legal 
transplantation of the US laws and leads not to the creation of a system of shared norms but to the extended 
application of the system of norms of the developed and economically superior partner. He makes similar 
arguments with respect to the enlargement and economic integration of the European Union. See Baker, 
ibid, at 1324-1325.   8 
aid  to  the  developing  countries  is  linked  to  those  countries’  implementation  of 
international arbitration as the primary method of dispute settlement.
26  
In sum, the increased economic and political integration of states has led to an 
increase in the number of DRMs that today facilitate the resolution of trade disputes. Two 
trends in international trade dispute settlement have been emerging over the past two 
decades.  The  first  trend  is  towards  juridicialization  of  the  DRM  or  a  shift  from 
“diplomatic” DRMs toward adjudication-based DRMs or at least multi-tier DRMs that 
combine  the  two  methods.  The  second  trend  is  the  shift  from  the  optional  and 
consultative jurisdiction to the compulsory jurisdiction of international tribunals.  
Some authors emphasize that, due to the above mentioned trends, the DRMs in 
RTAs  challenge  the  coherence  of  international  jurisprudence.  Studies  into  the 
relationship between the WTO, a form of global (multilateral) economic integration, and 
RTAs  often  lead  to  an  examination  of  the  relationship  between  the  WTO  dispute 
resolution  mechanisms  and  those  employed  by  the  RTAs,  suggesting  that  difficulties 
arise out of the overlap and conflicts of jurisdiction between the two forms of economic 
integration  and  between  their  DRMs.
27  For  example,  Kwan  and  Marceau  provide  a 
detailed analysis of the issue of the horizontal allocation of judicial jurisdiction between 
the RTAs’ dispute settlement mechanisms and those of the WTO. Their comprehensive 
study concludes that there is a greater potential for jurisdictional overlap in situations 
                                                 
26 “Resulting from these activities is the invisible hand of legal globalization, diffusing social norms, 
harmonizing cultural differences, suggesting model forms and clauses, insisting on legislation before aid is 
granted...” See Wolf, supra note 22 at 23. 
27 K. Kwan and G. Marceau, “Overlaps and Conflicts of Jurisdiction Between the World Trade 
Organization and Regional Trade Agreements” (2003) Vol. XLI Can. YB Int’l Law 83.  For a general 
analysis of conflicting jurisdictions of international tribunals see Y. Shany, The Competing Jurisdiction, 
supra note 13. Shany identifies two conditions that bring two or more sets of proceedings into competition. 
The first is that the multiple proceedings involve “the very same parties” and the second is that they are the 
proceedings over the same issues. See Y. Shany, The Competing Jurisdictions, supra note 13 at 26 and 27.   9 
where  an  RTA  provides  for  the  compulsory  jurisdiction  of  a  regional  standing  (or 
permanent) tribunal than when such jurisdiction is non-compulsory. Similarly, Romano 
argues that a shift in international treaty regimes, from the consensual to the compulsory 
jurisdiction of international tribunals, causes the unsatisfactory situation of concurrent 
jurisdiction and opens the door to parallel proceedings on the same dispute in different 
fora.
28  
Petersmann  predicts  that  the  trend  towards  overlapping  jurisdictions  in 
international  trade  law  will  continue  not  only  because  of  the  increasing  number  of 
international  courts  and  tribunals  but  also  because  of  the  overlap  between  their 
jurisdiction and that of the domestic courts, the increasing number of new international 
agreements that overlap with the WTO agreements and the lack of a formal hierarchy of 
the different international courts.
29 He sees the trend towards an increase in the number of 
international dispute settlement fora as a positive development “reflecting an enhanced 
                                                 
28 C. Romano, “From the Consensual to the Compulsory Paradigm in International Adjudication: Elements 
of a Theory of Consent” (2006) New York University Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers, 
Paper no. 20. Several judges of International Court of Justice have also warned of “the danger of 
fragmentation in the law, and the serious risk of inconsistency within the case law” and that “the 
proliferation of international courts may jeopardize the unity of international law”. See, for example, an 
address to the Plenary Session of the General Assembly of the UN by H.E. Judge Gilbert Guillaume, 
President of the International Court of Justice, 26 October 2000, and the speech of 30 October 2001, 
available online at 
http://library.lawschool.cornell.edu/cijwww/icjwww/ipresscom/SPEECHES/iSpeechPresident_Guillaume_
GA56_20011030.htm (last accessed on January 5, 2007). See also S. Oda, “Dispute Settlement Prospects in 
the Law of the Sea” (1995) 44 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 863. 
29 E-U. Petersmann, “Justice as Conflict Resolution: Proliferation, Fragmentation and Decentralization of 
Dispute Settlement in International Trade”(2006) 27 U. Pa. J. Int’l Econ. L. 273. Petersmann lists ten 
reasons for the increasingly overlapping jurisdictions and forum shopping in public international trade law 
and he argues that, because of the growing number of bilateral, regional and multilateral economic 
agreements, it is important for every government to choose the right dispute resolution mechanism and a 
policy that would lead toward the coordination of concurrent jurisdictions. See Petersmann, ibid. at 287-
298 and at 352.   10 
willingness by governments to strengthen the rule of law in transnational relations” and 
as a means to “help governments to limit power politics.”
30  
The development of the DRMs for CEFTA and several FTAs included in this 
study reflects the two trends referred to earlier: they have all established adjudicative 
mechanisms with detailed rules of procedure and their jurisdiction is mandatory. In the 
next  two  parts  of  this  article  these  DRMs  will  be  analyzed  in  the  context  of  their 
economic,  political,  social  and  legal  surroundings,  and  their  relationship  with  other 
international treaties and fora will be explained.  
 
2. The Success and Effectiveness of DRMs: Possible Points of Analysis 
The type(s) of dispute resolution regime chosen by the parties to an international 
treaty are usually seen as reflective of the depth of integration that the treaty intends; that 
is, reflective of the  economic and political goals that underpin the integration (including 
the level of internal or domestic support for the agreement in each participating state), the 
relationship between the parties to the RTA, and the parties’ attitudes towards the role of 
international institutions and towards the institutions’ DRMs.
31 It is often said also that 
states that are more powerful economically and politically choose to resolve their trade 
disputes by negotiation, which allows them to benefit from their bargaining power and 
                                                 
30 Petersmann, “Justice as Conflict Resolution”, ibid. at 358. Similar arguments are made by M. 
Koskenniemi & P. Leino, “Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern Anxieties” (2002) 15 Leiden 
J. Int’l L. 553 and P.S. Rao, “Multiple International Judicial Forums: A Reflection of the Growing Strength 
of International Law or Its Fragmentation” (2004) 25 Mich. J. Int’l L. 929. 
31 C. O’Neal Taylor, “Dispute Resolution as a Catalyst for Economic Integration and an Agent for 
Deepening Integration: NAFTA and MERCOSUR” (Winter 1996/Spring 1997) 17 NW. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 
850 at 851. Similar arguments regarding the governments’ choice between power-oriented negotiations and 
rule-oriented adjudications are provided by Petersmann, who says that the choice may depend not only on 
government policy and interests but also on “private interests and factual, legal and financial inputs from 
private actors involved in the economic disputes. See Petersmann, “Justice as Conflict Resolution”, supra 
note 20 at 340. See also A. K. Schneider, “Getting Along”, supra note 10 at 702 and F. Garcia, “New 
Frontiers in International Trade” supra note 14 at 381-382.     11 
thus attain resolutions advantageous to themselves.
32 A corresponding assumption is that 
a  rule-based  or  judicialized  DRM  that  relies  on  the  adjudication  of  disputes  by  an 
independent, impartial and unbiased third party in a transparent procedure supplemented 
by  an  enforcement  mechanism
33  is  beneficial  to  a  developing  country  that  lacks 
international economic, political and legal influence.
34  
In some cases, the complexity of the relationship between member states and the 
scope and objectives of their economic integration have led to the development of new 
forms of DRM. For example, the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
35, with 
its  wide  diversity  of  trade  issues  and  supplemental  agreements  on  labour  and  the 
environment, is often referred to as the treaty with multiple, innovative DRMs, such as its 
Chapter 11, which provides for arbitration of investment disputes.
36 If the treaty is more 
                                                 
32 J. H. Jackson, The World Trading System, supra note 11 at 109. 
33 See J.H. Jackson, The World Trading System, supra note 11. See also A. K. Schneider, “Getting Along” 
supra note 19 at 704-705. 
34 See W. M. Reisman & M. Wiedman, “Contextual Imperatives of Dispute Resolution Mechanisms; Some 
Hypotheses and Their Application in the Uruguay Round and NAFTA” (1995) 29:3 J. World T. 5 at 9. See 
also T. Broude, “From Pax Mercatoria to Pax Europea: How Trade Dispute Procedures Serve the EC’s 
Regional Hegemony”, The Israeli Association for the Study of European Integration, Working Paper 4/04 
at 4-5 (on file with the author). 
35 North American Free Trade Agreement, December 11-17, 1992, US-Canada-Mexico, chs 1-9, 32 I.L.M. 
289; chs 10-22, 32 I.L.M. 605. 
36 For example, Armand de Mestral identifies seven forms of DRM in NAFTA: “(1) Chapter 20, the 
residual procedure based on the GATT panel model; (2) Chapter 14 on financial services disputes, which 
adopts the same approach as Chapter 20, but which provides for panels made up of financial experts; (3) 
Chapter 19 which provides a recourse to challenge domestic decisions imposing anti-dumping and 
countervailing duties  (AD/CV) before a bi-national panel; (4) Chapter 11 B which deals with investment 
disputes under Chapter 11 A; (5) Article 2002 envisages recourse to the GATT/WTO procedures where 
they might lie under both agreements; (6) Article 2022 envisages the possibility of recourse to arbitration 
and other alternative means of dispute resolution between the Parties and (7) the “side agreements” on 
environmental and labour cooperation provide both for a private party complaints procedure before the 
respective Commissions…” See A.L.C. de Mestral,” NAFTA Dispute Settlement: Creative Experiment or 
Confusion?” in L Bartels & F. Ortino, eds., Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO Legal System, supra 
note 15, 359 at 361. Cherie O’Neil Taylor distinguishes five major DRMs: Chapter 20, or the main DRM 
for all general disputes arising under the terms of the NAFTA, Chapter 19 for the review of anti-dumping 
and countervailing duty determinations, Chapter 11 for investment disputes; and for labour and 
environment disputes on the basis of subsidiary agreements (the North American Agreement on Labour   12 
comprehensive  and  intended  to  lead  to  a  deeper  integration  of  the  parties,  then  the 
optimal dispute resolution mechanism is likely be the one that is more supranational, 
centralized,  and  capable  of  producing  enforceable  decisions.
37  However,  as  has  been 
noted by several scholars such as Helfer & Shaughter




41,  to  name  but  a  few,  even  when  RTAs  choose  the  same  DRM,  they 
achieve  very  different  levels  of  efficiency  because  of  a  number  of  factors:  economic 
(such as the goals and functions of economic integration, and the scope of economic 
exchange within the RTA); political (such as each state’s concerns regarding sovereignty, 
any internal opposition to the RTA that might exist within a state, perceptions in the 
various  states  of  the  role  of  international  institutions  and  international  law,  and  the 
independence of tribunals and courts); and social and legal factors (such as the legal 
                                                                                                                                                 
Cooperation and the North American Agreement on Economic Cooperation). See C. O’Neil Tayler, 
“Dispute Resolution as a Catalyst for Economic Integration” supra note 31 at 845. 
37 W. M. Reisman & M. Wiedman, “Contextual Imperatives of Dispute Resolution Mechanisms”, supra 
note 34 at 11. 
38 L. Helfer & M-A. Slaughter, “Towards a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication” (1997) 107 
Yale L. J. 273. Helfer and Slaughter suggest, based on their analysis of the functioning of the European 
courts—that is, the Court of Justice of the European Communities (ECJ) and the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECHR) that the following clusters of factors affect the success and effectiveness of supranational 
adjudication: “factors within the control of the states party to the treaty regime (the composition of the 
tribunal, the caseload and functional capacity of the court, independent fact finding capacity, and the legal 
status of treaties and the tribunal's decisions); factors within the control of the supranational tribunal itself 
(its awareness of audience, neutrality and demonstrated autonomy from political interests, its incrementalist 
style of decision making, the quality of its legal reasoning, its dialogue with other supranational tribunals, 
and the form of its opinions); and factors often beyond the control of both states and jurists (the nature of 
the violations to be monitored by the tribunal, autonomous domestic institutions committed to the rule of 
law, and the cultural and political homogeneity of the states subject to the supranational tribunal).“ 
39 See W.M Reisman & M. Wiedman, “Contextual Imperatives of Dispute Resolution Mechanisms”, supra 
note 34 at 10. 
40 C. O’ Neil Taylor, “Dispute Resolution as a Catalyst for Economic Integration” supra note 31 at 851. 
41 See A.K. Schneider, “Getting Along”, supra note 19 at 727-730. Similarly, William Davey argues that 
even though many of the DRMs in RTAs are modeled after the WTO’s DRM, they do not seem to be as 
successful as the WTO’s DRM. See W. Davey, “Dispute Settlement in the WTO and RTAs” in L. Bartels 
& F. Ortino, eds., Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO Legal System, supra note 15 at 354.   13 
culture of the society in general and its legal profession in particular and the people’s 
commitment to the rule of law and to liberalism and democracy).   
An analysis of the above factors, according to Helfer and Slaughter, provides the 
starting  point  for  determining  the  effectiveness  of  any  model  of  supranational 
adjudication  and  for  finding  out  how  it  might  be  possible,  if  it  is  at  all  possible,  to 
transplant a DRM that has worked well in one setting or within the framework of an RTA 
concluded  by  a  group  of  countries  in  a  particular  geographical  region,  into  an  RTA 
concluded by a different group of countries in a different geographical region.
42  
 
3. The Features of CEFTA: 
  Since its inception in 1992 CEFTA,
43 a unique form of subregional, top-down 
integration in preparation for yet another enlargement of the EU, has been the subject of 
numerous  academic  studies.
44  Those  studies  suggest  that  CEFTA  was  an  interim 
agreement established “to serve a basic market integration function as a part of the EU 
pre-accession  process,”
45  parallel  and  supplementary  to  the  conclusion  of  association 
                                                 
42 L. Helfer & M.-A. Slaughter, “Theory of Supranational Adjudication”, supra note 38 at 276. 
43 As previously stated CEFTA was signed in 1992 by Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland and it came 
into force in 1993. See supra note 14. 
44 See, for example, M. Dangerfield, Subregional Economic Cooperation in Central and Eastern Europe: 
The Political Economy of the CEFTA (Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 2000), “CEFTA: 
Between the CMEA and the European Union” (2004) 26 European Integration 309, “Subregional 
Integration and EU Enlargement: Where Next for CEFTA?” (2006) 44 JCMS 305, H. Hartnell, 
“Subregional Coalescence in European Regional Integration” (1997) 16 Wis. Int’l L. J. 115, M. Uvalic, 
“Regional Cooperation and the Enlargement of the European Union: Lessons Learned?” (2002) 23 Int’l 
Pol. Sci. Rev. 319, J. Zysman & A. Schwarzt, “Reunifying Europe in an Emerging World Economy: 
Economic Heterogeneity, New Industrial Options and Political Choices (1998) 36 JCMS 405, I. Mile, “The 
Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA): A Step Towards EU Membership or Genuine 
Cooperation” in: C. Paraskevopoulos,  A. Kintis & A. Kondonassis (eds.), Globalization And the Political 
Economy of Trade Policy, Chapter 12, (Toronto: APF Press, 2001) at 3.  
45 M. Dangerfield, “Subregional Integration and EU Enlargement: Where Next for CEFTA?”, supra note 
38 at 309. Dangerfield calls CEFTA “a fitness centre for the CEECs in the pre-accession process”. See M.   14 
agreements  between  the  EU  and  Hungary,  Poland,  Czechoslovakia,  and  later  with 
Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria,
46 and that it was “a horizontal extension at subregional 
level of the regime established by the Europe Agreements
47, which in turn replicate the 
basic structure of the EC Treaty.”
48 The studies further suggest that the EU sponsored the 
creation of CEFTA as a “proof of [the] political and organizational maturity”
49 of the 
candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and that, unlike the European Free 
Trade Association (EFTA),
50 CEFTA was not an alternative to the EU membership but 
rather an interim pre-accession training program. 
  It is possible to distinguish at least two phases in the evolution of CEFTA, the 
first phase being from its establishment until the 2004 enlargement of the EU, at which 
point  it  began  the  current  phase  of  revitalization,  enlargement,  modification  and 
modernization in several ways that will be discussed below.  Even though the Visegrad 
group’s initial negotiations in 1992 had not contemplated the possibility of enlargement 
                                                                                                                                                 
Dangerfield, “Subregional Cooperation in Central and Eastern Europe: Support or Substitute for the 
‘Return to Europe’?” (2001) 2 Perspectives on European Politics and Society 55 at 67. 
46 M. Farrell, “The EU and Inter-Regional Cooperation: In Search of A Global Presence” in E. Jones & A. 
Verdun, eds., The Political Economy of European Integration: Theory and Analysis (New York: Routledge, 
2005) 128 at 141. 
47 A Europe Agreement (EA) is a bilateral agreement, a specific type of association agreement concluded 
between the EU and the Central and Eastern European countries, candidates for EU membership.   The EA 
is based on respect for human rights, democracy, the rule of law and the market economy, requires that the 
candidates for membership harmonize their national legislation with the EU law and covers a political 
dialogue between the parties as well as establishment of their trade relations and social, cultural and 
development cooperation. See more at http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/europe_agreement_en.htm . 
 
48 H. Hartnell, “Subregional Coalescence In European Regional Integration”, supra note 44 at 183. Harntell 
found that the rules regarding movement of goods, state monopolies, state aids and competition “is 
identical throughout the entire web of treaties”. See ibid, footnote 300. See also M. Dangerfield, 
“Suregional Integration and EU Enlargement: Where Next for CEFTA?”, supra note 44 at 310. 
49 I. Mile, “The Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA): A Step Towards EU Membership or 
Genuine Cooperation”, supra note 44. 
50 Convention Establishing European Free Trade Association, signed at Stockholm on 4 January 1960, in 
force 3 May 1960, S.R. 0.63.31. More on EFTA see in A. R. Ziegler, “The EFTA Experience” in L. Bartels 
& F. Ortino, Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO System, supra note 15 at 407-419.   15 
of CEFTA, four other candidates for EU membership accessed to the agreement between 
1995  and  2003.  There  were  Slovenia  (1995),  Romania  (1997),  Bulgaria  (1999)  and 
Croatia (2003).  
The major characteristics of CEFTA in its first phase were that it was a free trade 
agreement concluded between the potential candidates for EU membership, that it was 
compliant with Article XXIV of GATT,
51 was transitional in nature
52 since it would last 
only until its members acceded to the EU, that its provisions had to be compatible with 
the association agreements signed between the EU and each of the CEFTA members
53 
and,  ultimately,  the  Treaty  Establishing  the  European  Community  (the  EC  Treaty).
54 
CEFTA is also seen as a result of the EU’s desire to reconnect former members of the 
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA)
55 and to “integrate them into GATT 
structured and market oriented economies.”
56 
                                                 
51 Article 1(1) CEFTA expressly refers to its compatibility with Article XXIV of the GATT.  
52 The original CEFTA Article 1(1) had provided for a transitional period ending on 1 January 2001.  
53 However, the first association agreements signed with the Visegrad group did not call for the 
establishment of subregional cooperation between these Central and Eastern European countries. 
Dangerield finds first such call in the Europe Agreement concluded with Slovenia. See M. Dangerfield, 
“CEFTA: Between the CMEA and the European Union”, supra note 44 at 323. 
54 Treaty Establishing the European Community (consolidated version of the Treaty Establishing European 
Union and of the Treaty Establishing European Community), O.J. C 321 E of 29 December 2006, available 
online at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2006/ce321/ce32120061229en00010331.pdf (last 
accessed on March 18, 2007).  
55 CMEA was a form of trade cooperation of the socialist bloc of countries organized by the Soviet Union 
that functioned as a tariff-free area and a market at which pricesw were set administratively, and which led 
to specialization of production within the Central and Eastern European countries that facilitated primarily 
needs of the Soviet market. See I. Mile, “The Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA): A Step 
Towards EU Membership or Genuine Cooperation”, supra note 44, at 2. 
56 M. Dangerfield, “CEFTA: Between the CMEA and the European Union”, supra note 44 at 312. See also 
a recent speech by Peter Mandelson, the EU Trade Commissioner, at the Launch of renewed CEFTA 
expansion negotiations, given in Bucharest on April 6, 2006, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/mandelson/speeches_articles/sppm093_en.htm (last accessed on 
April 28, 2007). Mandelson remarked that “[T]rade is at the very heart of both the EU Stabilization and 
Association process and the European Neighbourhood Policy. Trade liberalisation can, under the right 
conditions, make a huge contribution to economic development and, in turn, provide the foundations for 
political stability. That is why this agreement is a particularly welcome step forward in a region which has   16 
CEFTA membership was initially limited to WTO member countries that signed a 
Europe Agreement (EA) with the EU. The consent of all other CEFTA members was an 
additional requirement for membership. Article 1 of the CEFTA treaty stated that its main 
objectives were to gradually establish a free trade area among its member states and to: 
“a.  foster…  the  advance  of  economic  activity,  the  improvement  of  living  and 
employment conditions, and increased productivity and financial stability; b. provide fair 
conditions  of  competition  for  trade…;  c.  contribute…by  [the]  removal  of  barriers  to 
trade, to the harmonious development and expansion of world trade.”
57 However, the 
1992 treaty did not exclude the possibility for its member states to establish other forms 
of integration (such as customs unions) among themselves.
58 
As suggested earlier, certain substantive provisions of CEFTA mirrored those of 
the EAs concluded between the EU and each of the CEFTA member states. CEFTA 
addressed the area of movement of industrial goods and, to a limited extent, agricultural 
products, and one of its aims was to liberalize the movement of capital, but it did not 
provide  for  the  free  movement  of  people  or  services.  In  that  respect,  therefore,  the 
CEFTA provisions were closer to those of the WTO than of the EC Treaty since the latter 
provides  for  free  movement  of  goods,  persons,  services  and  capital.
59  CEFTA  also 
                                                                                                                                                 
known recent tragedies…Closer economic integration with the EU and the development of closer trade 
links within your region should be seen as mutually reinforcing objectives. They are not in contradiction. 
Regional integration is a natural objective between neighbours. It is also essential in strengthening the 
performance of your economies, and in preparing for the competitive impact of participating in the EU’s 
single market. This is why the European Commission has always offered strong political and technical 
support for trade opening in this region.” 
57 1992 CEFTA Article 1(2). 
58 1992 CEFTA Article 33: Evolutionary Clause. 
59 M. Dangerfield, “CEFTA: Between the CMEA and the EU”, supra note 44, at 318. Dangerfield 
emphasizes that V4 lacked any desired to establish free movement of labour due to great difference in 
unemployment levels among the members and concern that they should not be undertaking measures that   17 
regulated  in  a  broad  manner  the  protection  of  intellectual  property,  government 
procurement and state aid. 
The institutional structure of CEFTA mirrored the institutional structure of the 
EAs and FTAs concluded between the EU and the third countries, with the exception of 
the agreement between the European Union and the EFTA on the establishment of the 
European Economic Area (EEA).
60 The institutional framework of most of the EU FTAs 
is limited to the Joint Committee or Joint Council, which is a rather intergovernmental 
than supranational body and which has very limited legislative functions. CEFTA’s Joint 
Committee  is  no  exception  to  that  practice.  It  is  composed  of  representatives  of  the 
CEFTA  members  and  is  more  a  forum  for  the  exchange  of  information  and  for 
consultation among the parties of the Agreement than a decision making body.
61 The 
Committee meets whenever necessary and requested by one or more of the parties the, 
but at least once a year,
62 and it makes decisions by consensus.
63 It cannot act as a dispute 
settlement body.
64  
It  is  usually  suggested  that  this  weak  institutional  structure  and  limited  law 
making power of the Joint Committee is the result of a combination of factors such as the 
fact that CEFTA has been modeled on the EAs, the sour experience its members had had 
in dealing with the bureaucracy of the CMEA, and members’ concerns over the potential 
                                                                                                                                                 
would not be coordinated with their relations toward the EU. Lack of progress in liberalization of 
movement of labour resulted in lack of progress in liberalization of services. M. Dangerfield, ibid, at 319. 
60 See G. Bercero, “Dispute Settlement in European Union FTAs: Lesson Learned?”, supra note 15 at 385.  
61 1992 CEFTA Article 34. 
62 1992 CEFTA Article 35(1). 
63 1992 CEFTA Article 35(2). 
64 1992 CEFTA Article 31(3).   18 
loss of national sovereignty.
65 Certainly, considering the fact that the EA model strongly 
emphasized  the  requirement  for  national  laws  to  approximate  the  EC  laws  as  a  pre-
condition to EU membership, the Visegrad group did not find it necessary to enable the 
CEFTA Joint Committee with the legislative power and mandate to harmonize the laws 
of the CEFTA members.  
When  the  V4  countries  and  Slovenia  became  EU  members  in  2004,  CEFTA 
became a free trade area of only three countries—Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia—and it 
faced a possible dissolution because Bulgaria and Romania were scheduled to join the 
EU  in  2007.
66  However,  CEFTA  did  not  dissolve  but  instead  grew  bigger  and  more 
complex. In November 2004, at its summit in Bulgaria, proposals were made to expand 
trade issues covered by CEFTA to include cross-border investments, joint infrastructure 
projects  and  measures  to  develop  tourism.  In  April  2006,  in  Bucharest,  a  year  after 
Macedonia  joined,  a  decision  was  made  to  allow  further  enlargement  of  the  area  by 
accepting Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova, Montenegro, Serbia and the UN 
Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo as members. Finally, on December 19, 2006, 
in Bucharest, the two “old” CEFTA members, Croatia and Macedonia, and the six new 
members signed the Agreement on Amendment of and Accession of the CEFTA (CEFTA 
2006).
67 The member states have undertaken the obligation to establish a free trade area 
                                                 
65 Both Hartnell and Dangerfield point out that deepening CEFTA could lead to overlapping arrangements 
with the EU and CEFTA’s member states as articulated in EAs.  See H. Hartnell, supra note 44 at 183-184 
and M. Dangerfield, “CEFTA: Between the CMEA and the European Union”, supra note 44 at 316. 
66 But see H. Hartnell, supra note 44 at 212-213. As early as in 1997, Professor Helen Hartnell envisioned 
the increasing role of CEFTA in regional integration and EU enlargement and suggested that as the process 
of enlargement slows down, CEFTA would be a valuable experience in cooperation for the potential 
candidates for EU membership and a counterweight to the EU’s influence in the region  
67 Consolidated Version of the CEFTA (CEFTA 2006) is available online at 
www.stabilitypact.org/trade/ANNICEFTA%202006%20Final%20Text.pdf as Annex 1 to the Agreement   19 
by December 31, 2010.
68 The new CEFTA is to continue indefinitely and any country 
that becomes an EU member will automatically withdraw from it at the latest on the day 
before its EU membership takes effect.
69 
The new enlargement of CEFTA was made possible by a change in the conditions 
of membership that allowed non-WTO members to join. It is noteworthy that the new 
candidates for CEFTA membership were countries involved not only in the EU bilateral 
association  agreement-type  integration  initiatives  (called  Stabilization  and  Association 
Agreements or SAAs
70) but also in the multilateral integration initiative, the Stability 
Pact for South Eastern Europe (SP).
71 The EU initiative to integrate the Western Balkan 
countries into CEFTA and to offer them the prospect of EU membership is an attempt to 
bring cooperation to a region that has had no history of such cooperation and that has had 
numerous violent conflicts that ended in the establishment of trade barriers and various 
                                                                                                                                                 
on Amendment of and Accession to the Central European Free Trade Agreement (last accessed on April 
18, 2007). 
68 CEFTA 2006 Article 1(1). 
69 CEFTA 2006 Article 51. 
70 However, this EU association initiative does not include Moldova. Stabilization and Association 
Agreements are means of the Stabilisation and Association Process launched at the Zagreb Summit in 
November 2000. SAP articulates the EU policy towards the countries of the Western Balkans (Albania, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia, 
including Kosovo). The goal of the process is to “ensure peace and stability in the region by providing 
support for the strengthening of democracy and the rule of law and the development of a market economy.” 
Stabilization and Association Agreements are to establish special bilateral relations between the EU and 
each country of the region and to harmonize their laws with those of the EU and thus to prepare the 
Western Balkan countries for potential EU membership. For more on SAP and SAAs see 
http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/s05055.htm . 
71 On complexities of bilateral and multilateral approaches to regional integration see P. Spassova, 
“Regional Cooperation in the Balkans as an Essential Step Towards EU Membership; Lessons of 
Visegrad,” Working paper no. 148, December 2004, Institute for World Economics of the Hungarian 
Academy of Science. M. Dangerfield, “Subregional Integration and EU Enlargement: Where Next for 
CEFTA?”, supra note 44  at 312-313. The Stability Pact is an international response to the war and crises in 
the South Eastern Europe, initiated in 1999 by the EU and gathering more than 40 partner countries and 
organizations around the world in a common effort to restore peace and security in the region and achieve 
democracy, economic development and respect for human rights in the area. For more on the SP see 
http://www.stabilitypact.org/about/default.asp.   20 
other obstacles to cross-border activities.
72 The Stability Pact is a similar joint initiative 
of the EU and more than 40 other partners (countries and international organizations).
73 
The  second  important  change  brought  by  CEFTA  2006  is  that  its  Article  4 
required  all  new  member  states  to  abolish  their  existing  bilateral  trade  agreements.
74 
Thus, 31 bilateral trade agreements were superseded by CEFTA which then becomes the 
only FTA in the region.  In that way CEFTA becomes a multilateral free trade framework 
for the whole region rather then “spaghetti ball” of bilateral agreements.
75  
The third change is related to the scope and substantive provisions of CEFTA 
2006. As amended, the treaty sets out more detailed provisions regarding free movement 
of goods, the protection of intellectual property, services and competition, and it includes 
                                                 
72 P. Spassova, “Regional Cooperation in the Balkans as an Essential Step Towards EU Membership; 
Lessons of Visegrad,” ibid. at 3. 
73 The Stability Pact is an international response to the war and crises in the South Eastern Europe, initiated 
in 1999 by the EU and gathering more than 40 partner countries and organizations around the world in a 
common effort to restore peace and security in the region and achieve democracy, economic development 
and respect for human rights in the area. For more on the SP see 
http://www.stabilitypact.org/about/default.asp. It is important to note that the Stability Pact’s Working 
Group on Trade has helped CEFTA to develop and implement strategies for economic development. This 
Group consists of senior trade policy officials from the EU’s Trade Directorate, WTO, World Bank, 
Germany, Hungary, Norway, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, UK and USA. The Trade Working 
Group recommended that Ministers of Economy of SEE countries pursue a single FTA through the 
enlargement and amendment of CEFTA. See the CEFTA background documents at 
http://www.stabilitypact.org/trade/documents/DBSP%20TWG%20and%20the%20Single%20FTA.pdf (last 
accessed on April 28, 2007). 
74 Annex 2 to the Agreement on Amendment of and Accession to the Central European Free Trade 
Agreement, available online at 
http://www.stabilitypact.org/trade/ANNEX%202%20TO%20AGREEMENT%20RE%20BILATERAL%20
FTAs%20TO%20BE%20TERMINATED.pdf (last accessed on April 18, 2007) 
75 See remarks at the launch of CEFTA expansion negotiations given by Peter Mandelson, the EU Trade 
Commissioner, in Bucharest on April 6, 2006 which summarizes benefits of having one FTA: “You have 
already achieved impressive results through the conclusion and implementation of more than 30 bilateral 
Free Trade Agreements… Today, you are taking and important step forward, in agreeing to start 
negotiations to extend and improve CEFTA, and  thereby replace the current network of FTAs with one 
economically efficient, integrated and modern agreement… The potential benefits are huge. As one large, 
integrated market the region will attract more investment. In consolidating and making more transparent 
regional trade rules trade rules you will give a boost to businesses within the regions..” Available online at 
http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/mandelson/speeches_articles/sppm093_en.htm (last accessed on 
April 28, 2007).   21 
some completely new sections, such as those on investments (Chapter 6B), transparency 
(Article 44) and arbitration as a means of dispute settlement (Article 43). It also makes 
more direct references to the EC Treaty
76 and the relevant GATT and WTO disciplines.
77 
However,  CEFTA  2006  has  not  empowered  its  Joint  Committee  with broader 
law-making powers nor has it changed its intergovernmental rather than supranational 
nature.
78 Thus, the Joint Committee remains a body with limited decision making power 
whose primary function is to provide a forum for the exchange of information and for 
consultations among its member states and it still makes decisions by consensus. What is 
new is that the amended CEFTA has provided for the Joint Committee to be supported by 
a permanent secretariat located in Brussels.
79 
 
4. CEFTA DRMs: Institutional and Jurisdictional Issues 
 
“This agreement should modernize and improe CEFTA by: 
•  Including clear and effective procedures for dispute settlement and a mechanism 
to improve compliance by all parties both to the agreement and to WTO rules, 
including for those parties not yet members of the WTO…” 
                                                 
76 For example, Article 20(1): Rules of Competition Concerning Undertakings copies Article 81(1) of the 
EC Treaty while Article 20(2) mirrors similar provisions in EAs and it mandates that any anti-competitive 
practice that infringes CEFTA Article 20 be “assessed on the basis of the principles of the competition rules 
applicable in the EC, in particular Articles 81, 82 and 86 of the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community.” 
77 For example, see CEFTA Article 2(4) Basic Duties, Article 6 Customs Fees, Article 11(1) Concessions 
and Agricultural Policies, Article 12 Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Article 13 Technical Barriers to 
Trade, Article 19 State Monopolies and State Trading Enterprises. 
78 See CEFTA 2006 Articles 40-41. 
79 CEFTA 2006 Article 40(2).   22 
Joint Declaration by Prime Ministers
80 
 
4.1 EU practice with respect to DRM models: Preliminary issues 
  It has already been argued that CEFTA’s institutional and legal framework was 
shaped by the EU’s experience in establishing association (and free trade) agreements 
with third countries. Accordingly, CEFTA incorporated DRM modalities that had earlier 
been utilized by the EU. Bercero and Robles recently analyzed all dispute settlement 
clauses  in  the  EU  FTAs  and  found  that  the  development  of  those  DRMs  over  time 
confirms two general trends of DRM evolution in international law— the proliferation of 
DRMs and shift towards more adjudicative and compulsory DRMs.
81 Their findings will 
be the starting point for the analysis presented below of the evolution of DRM clauses in 
CEFTA. 
  Bercero and Robles found that every FTA concluded by the EU has a dispute 
resolution clause. Most of the FTAs concluded by EU and the third countries during the 
GATT era followed the political model of dispute resolution which was, indeed, the basic 
model of GATT itself. However, five years after the establishment of the WTO and its 
introduction of a DSU that included a quasi-adjudicative model of dispute settlement, the 
EU  DRM  clauses  in  FTAs  started  to  change.  In  examining  this  tendency,  Bercero 
grouped the FTAs Bercero into the following three categories:  
1.  FTAs within the EU space (the EEA, the EAs and the SAAs); 
                                                 
80 Adopted at the South Eastern Europe Summit, Bucharest, April 6, 2006. The full text of the Joint 
Declaration is available online at http://www.stabilitypact.org/trade/documents/tradeFINAL-
joint%20declaration.pdf (last accessed on April 28, 2007). 
81 See I. G. Bercero, “Dispute Settlement in European Union Free Trade Agreements: Lesson Learned?”, 
supra note 15, and E.R. Robles, “Political & Quasi-Adjudicative Dispute Settlement Models in European 
Union Free Trade Agreements”, supra note 9.   23 
2.  FTAs  with  neighbouring  countries  (association  agreements  concluded  with 
EURO-Med countries); and 
3.  FTAs  with  non-neighbouring  countries  (Economic  Partnership  Agreements 
(EPAs) with the ACP countries under the Cotonou Agreement initiative and FTAs 
with third countries geographically distant from the EU borders such as Mexico 
and Chile).
82 
His analysis shows that the shift towards a quasi-adjudicative model first occurred 
in  FTAs  in  the  third  category  whereas  in  the  first  two  categories  diplomatic  model 
prevailed until 2000.
83 In the pre-WTO period, dispute resolution was typically addressed 
in only one article of an FTA and the parties would be directed to resolve disputes related 
to  interpretation  and  application  of  the  FTA  by  direct  consultations  or by  diplomatic 
negotiations  and  consultations  through  the  FTA’s  Joint  Committee.
84  EAs,  though, 
provided that the Joint Committee could decide disputes and that its decision is binding 
on  the  parties.
85  If  there  were  any  reference  to  traditional  arbitration,  it  would  be 
                                                 
82 I.G. Bercero, “Dispute Settlement in European Union Free Trade Agreements: Lesson Learned?” , 
“Dispute Settlement in European Union Free Trade Agreements: Lesson Learned?” supra note 15 at 385. 
83 It should be noted that even the EEA made a shift towards quasi-adjudicative model in 2001 with the 
Vaduz Convention when it added Annex T to Article 48 of the original 1992 EEA to introduce arbitration 
based on the rules inspired by the WTO DSU in addition to the already existing Article III(1)(2) of EEA 
which provided for consultation procedure within the A Joint Committee as the main DRM and only if the 
parties agree, the dispute not resolved before the Joint Committee could be sent to the ECJ. See A. Ziegler, 
“The EFTA Experience” in L. Bartels & F. Ortino, Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO System, 
supra note 15 at 408-411. 
84 See, for example, DRMs in FTAs concluded between the EU and the Euro-Med countries, the EAs 
concluded with the Central and Eastern European countries in the 1990s or the 1963 Association 
Agreement between the EEC and Turkey. 
85 Article 107 of the Europe Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities 
and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Hungary, of the other part (O.J. L 347, 
31/12/1993 p. 0002 - 0266) states that:  
“1. Each of the two Parties may refer to the Association Council any dispute relating to the application or 
interpretation of this Agreement. 
2. The Association Council may settle the dispute by means of a decision. 
3. Each Party shall be bound to take the measures involved in carrying out the decision referred to in   24 
arbitration based on the consensual decision of the parties to arbitrate, and would be 
subject  to  a  vague  set  of  procedural  rules,  with  non-binding  decisions  of  the  arbitral 
tribunal and without any enforcement procedure.
86 It is noteworthy that prior to 2000 this 
model of DRM was used consistently by the EU regardless of the depth or scope of 
integration that the agreement was intended to achieve, meaning that it was used in the 
same manner both in agreements intended to prepare third countries for accession to EU 
membership and in agreements that did not have that objective.
87  
Scholars  differ  in  their  explanation  of  why  the  EU  favours  a  political dispute 
resolution model. Broude, for example, sees it as power-based model dependant on the 
political context of inter-RTA relations and claims that this services the EC’s regional 
hegemony
88 whereas a rule-based DRM, by relying on impartial third party adjudication 
and providing an efficient method of enforcement, would detach trade disputes from the 
                                                                                                                                                 
paragraph 2. 
4. In the event of it not being possible to settle the dispute in accordance with paragraph 2, either Party may 
notify the other of the appointment of an arbitrator; the other Party must then appoint a second arbitrator 
within two months. For the application of this procedure, the Community and the Member States shall be 
deemed to be one Party to the dispute. 
The Association Council shall appoint a third arbitrator. 
The arbitrators' decisions shall be taken by majority vote. 
Each party to the dispute must take the steps required to implement the decision of the arbitrators.” 
86 I.G. Bercero, “Dispute Settlement in European Union Free Trade Agreements: Lesson Learned?”, supra 
note 15 at 385 and  E.R. Robles, “Political & Quasi-Adjudicative Dispute Settlement Models in European 
Union Free Trade Agreements”, supra note 9 at 21. Note that Article 107 of the Europe Agreement 
concluded between the EU and Hungary of 13 December 1993, ibid, states that each party to the dispute 
must take the steps required to implement the decision of the arbitrators but it does not say what would 
happen if a party to the dispute does not take  such measures. See also other EAs, for example, Europe 
Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the 
one part, and the Czech Republic, of the other part (OJ L 360, 31/12/1993) Articles 107(4) and 117(2) or 
Europe Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member 
States, of the one part, and Poland, of the other part (OJ L348, 31/12/1993) Articles 105(4) and 115(2). 
87 E. R. Robles, “Political & Quasi-Adjudicative Dispute Settlement Models in European Union Free Trade 
Agreements”, supra note 9 at 14 and 15. Robles summarizes her analysis of the EAs concluded between the 
EC and Estonia, Poland, Czech Republic and Slovak Republic in Table 2 at 15 to show that the same model 
has been used throughout all EAs. In Table 3 at p. 17 she proves that the similar DRM provisions were 
introduced into EU’s association agreements with the Euro-Med countries. 
88 T. Broude, “From Pax Mercatoria to Pax Europea”, supra note 34.   25 
political process and from the political considerations in which the EU deals.
89 He finds 
that, despite the non-judicialized character of the EU’s DRM and the fact that it makes no 
reference whatsoever to possibility of overlapping jurisdiction with the DRMs of other 
RTAs and  of GATT, the EU has had very few disputes with its FTA partners and that 
most of the EU FTA partners do not use the WTO DSU. The EU itself has almost never 
taken  south  a  WTO  settlement  in  disputes  with  its  partners.
90  Broude  does  mention 
Turkey, Mexico and Chile as being exceptions but the latter two have FTAs with the EU 
that involve quasi-adjudicative rather than political model of dispute settlement.  
Bercero and Robles argue that the EU choice of political dispute settlement model 
is  due  to  its  institutional  conservativism  and  tendency  to  follow  previously  utilized 
models.
91 Indeed, prior to NAFTA and the WTO, there was no FTA that had a binding 
arbitration  clause.
92  Instead,  FTAs  tended  to  follow  the  GATT  model  of  dispute 
settlement, which was based on negotiation and conciliation; that is, on a consensual 
decision making process.
93 In the view of these authors, the EU has started to negotiate 
quasi-judicial models of dispute settlement after they were first introduced by NAFTA 
and the WTO, but only as an alternative or addition to the political model. 
The quasi-adjudicative model of dispute settlement is a hybrid based on several 
elements of arbitration and judicial settlement and some elements of the political model 
of dispute settlements. The WTO DSU is usually cited as such a model because dispute 
                                                 
89 Ibid. at 9-10. 
90 Ibid. at 29. 
91 I. G. Bercero, “Dispute Settlement in European Union Free Trade Agreements: Lesson Learned?” , supra 
note 15 at 390, and E.R. Robles, “Political & Quasi-Adjudicative Dispute Settlement Models in European 
Union Free Trade Agreements”, supra note 9 at 12 and 35. 
92 I. G. Bercero, “Dispute Settlement in European Union Free Trade Agreements: Lesson Learned?”, ibid. 
93 For a detailed analysis of political dispute settlement model see E. R. Robles, “Political & Quasi-
Adjudicative Dispute Settlement Models in European Union Free Trade Agreements”, supra note 9 at 4-9.   26 
settlement consultation (the political model)as its first stage with a panel review, as the 
second stage and an Appellate  Body (AB) decision, the appellate stage (the last two 
stages  both  being  adjudicative  models).  In  brief,  the  WTO  DSU  has  introduces 
compulsory  jurisdiction,  a  defined  and  transparent  pre-established  procedure  for  each 
stage of dispute settlement, an appellate stage, and empowerment of the AB to issue 
binding decisions.
94 
It was in its FTA with Mexico that the EU first included a quasi adjudicative 
model for dispute settlement with third countries.
95 Since then, the dispute settlement 
mechanism options in its FTAs concluded with non-neighbouring countries, such as the 
FTA with Chile
96 and EPAs with the ACP countries based on the Cotonou Agreement of 
June  23,  2000,  have  included  fully  developed  arbitration  proceedings  in  addition  to 
bilateral consultation and consultations within the Joint Committee. The introduction of 
that quasi-adjudicative model in the EU-Mexico FTA also triggered changes to some of 
the FTAs between the EU and states within the EU space (e.g., modification of EEA by 
                                                 
94 E. R. Robles, “Political & Quasi-Adjudicative Dispute Settlement Models in European Union Free Trade 
Agreements”, supra note 9 at 25-26. 
95 Supra note 16. 
96 Agreement establishing an association between the European Community and its Member States, of the 
one part, and the Republic of Chile, of the other part (EU-Chile Association Agreement) OJ L352, 
3/10/2002, the trade provisions entered into force on an interim basis in February 2003 but the full 
agreement entered into force on 1 March 2005.   27 
the  2001  Vaduz  Convention
97)  but  not  to  those  with  potential  candidates  for  EU 
membership (the EAs and SAAs
98). 
The  DRM  related  provisions  of  the  EU  FTAs  with  Mexico  and  Chile  were 
obviously inspired by the WTO DSU and they have several features in common: the 
procedural arbitration rules are well developed and laid out in several article and the 
decision to take a dispute to arbitration does not require consensus but is the right of any 
party should consultations fail to resolve the dispute.
99 Both FTAs include provisions 
intended  to  avoid  concurrent  proceedings  before  the  FTA  tribunal  and  a  WTO 
                                                 
97 See Annex T: Arbitration of the EFTA Convention, available at 
http://secretariat.efta.int/Web/EFTAConvention/EFTAConventionTexts/EFTAConventionAnnexes/Annex
TArbitration.pdf (last accessed on April 28, 2007). The consolidated version of the Convention 
Establishing European Free Trade Association (EFTA 2001 Convention) is available at 
http://secretariat.efta.int/Web/EFTAConvention/EFTAConventionTexts/EFTAConventionText/EFTAConv
ention2001.pdf (last accessed on April 28, 2007). 
98 Moreover, the SAAs do not have any provisions related to possibility to arbitrate disputes. See, for 
example, Article 113 of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities 
and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Croatia, of the other part (OJ L26, 
28/1/2005, p. 0003-0220) which is similar to article on dispute resolution in the EAs: “Each Party shall 
refer to the Stabilization and Association Council relating to the application of interpretation of this 
Agreement. The Stabilization and Association Council may settle the dispute by means of a binding 
decision.” Compare with Article 107 of the EA concluded between the EU and Hungary, supra note 84. 
Note that the EUROMed association agreements include dispute settlement provisions similar to those of 
the EAs. See E. R. Robles, “Political & Quasi-Adjudicative Dispute Settlement Models in European Union 
Free Trade Agreements”, supra note 9 at 17; Table 3. Thus, both the EAs and the EUROMed association 
agreements provide for the possibility to arbitrate disputes, thought decisions of the arbitration lack binding 
power or they are binding only under consensus of the parties. 
99 EU-Chile FTA, Article 184: “Article 184; Initiation of the procedure 
1. Parties shall at all times endeavour to reach a mutually satisfactory agreement on the dispute. 
2. Where a Party considers that an existing measure of the other Party is in breach of an obligation under 
the provisions referred to in Article 182 and such matter has not been resolved within 15 days after the 
Association Committee has convened pursuant to Article 183(3) or 45 days after the delivery of the request 
for consultations within the Association Committee, whichever is earlier, it may request in writing the 
establishment of an arbitration panel. 
EU-Mexico FTA, Free Trade Area in services: Decision No 2/2001 of the EU-Mexico Joint Council of 27 
February 2001 implementing Articles 6, 9, 12(2)(b) and 50 of the Economic Partnership, Political 
Coordination and Cooperation Agreement (OJ L70/7); Article 39; Establishment of an arbitration panel: 
1.  In case a Party considers that a measure applied by the other Party violates the covered legal instruments 
and such matter has not been resolved within 15 days after the Joint Committee has convened pursuant to 
Article 38(3) or 45 days after the delivery of the request for a Joint Committee meeting, either Party may 
request in writing the establishment of an arbitration panel. 
2.  The requesting Party shall state in the request the measure and indicate the provisions of the covered 
legal instruments that it considers relevant, and shall deliver the request to the other Party and to the Joint 
Committee.   28 
panel/tribunal. However, while the EU-Mexico FTA states that the two procedures are 
not mutually exclusive but simply cannot be concurrent, the EU-Chile FTA explicitly 
states that they are mutually exclusive.
100 
In  addition  to  different  solution  of  the  concurrent  jurisdiction  issue,  here  are 
several  other  important  differences  between  the  two  FTAs:  the  EU-Chile  FTA 
specifically excludes competition issues from arbitration, provides for the submission of 
amicus curiae briefs and requires the parties to cooperate on increasing transparency, 
while the EU-Mexico FTA does not have any provisions on these matters. The two FTAs 
also  differ  with  the  respect  to  appointment  of  third  arbitrator.  The  EU-Mexico  FTA 
provides that in the case of the parties’ failure to agree on the third arbitrator, she/he will 
be selected by lot from the list of candidates for the Chair nominated by each party to the 
dispute.
101 The EU-Chile FTA provides that the selection will be made by lot from an 
agreed roster of 15 panelists (five nationals of each party and five that are non-nationals 
of the parties).
102 Note that admissibility of amici curiae briefs as permitted in the EU-
Chile FTA
103 had never before been seen in an EU FTA. 
In conclusion, it is possible to say that the EU is slowly moving towards WTO-
type DRMs in its FTAs but that the political model of dispute settlements still prevails in 
its FTAs with third countries. 
 
 
                                                 
100 Article 47(4) of the EC-Mexico FTA; Decision No 2/2000 of the EU-Mexico Joint Council of 23March 
2000(OJ L157/10) and Article 189(4)(c) of the EC-Chile Association Agreement, supra note 96. 
101 Article 40(4) of the Decision No. 2/2001 (re: services). 
102 Article 185(2)(3) of the EU-Chile Association Agreement. 
103 See Articles 35-37 of the ANNEX XV of the EU-Chile Association Agreement available online at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2004/november/tradoc_111642.pdf (last accessed on April 29, 2007).   29 
4.2. CEFTA Practice: Following in the steps of the EU  
  Article 31 contains CEFTA 1992’s only provisions related to dispute settlement. 
They were based on the political model of DRM—that is, direct bilateral consultations 
between the parties to a dispute and, where necessary, subsequent consultations between 
the parties within the Joint Committee. These provisions made no reference to the GATT 
dispute settlement mechanism and there is no record that they have ever been used. In 
contrast,  since  the  WTO  DSU  has  been  established,  several  CEFTA  members  have 
submitted their disputes to its panels/tribunals for settlement.
104 However, not all of the 
disputes that could have arisen between the CEFTA members could be resolved through 
the WTO DSU. For example, disputes arising out of the application or infringement of 
competition rules concerning undertakings (CEFTA Article 22) have had to be resolved 
in accordance with the procedure set out in CEFTA Article 31—through consultation of 
the parties. Since competition policy has not been part of the WTO agreements, its quasi-
adjudicative procedure does not extend to resolution of competition related disputes and 
was therefore not available to the CEFTA disputants. 
                                                 
104 DISPUTE DS148 (1998; Hungary complainant, Czech Republic respondent, no panel established nor 
settlement notified; measure affecting import duty on wheat from Hungary); DISPUTE DS240 (2001; 
Hungary complainant, Romania respondent, Hungary withdrew request for establishment of a panel; import 
prohibition on wheat and wheat flour from Hungary); DISPUTE DS235 (2001; Poland complainant, 
Slovakia respondent, no panel established  and mutually agreed solutions notified under Article 3.6 of the 
DSU; safeguard measure on imports of sugar); DISPUTE DS143 (1998; Hungary complainant, Slovakia 
respondent; no panel established nor settlement notified; measure affecting import duty on wheat from 
Hungary); DISPUTE DS159 (1999; Czech Republic complainant, Hungary respondent; consultations 
requested, no panel established nor settlement notified; safeguard measure on imports of steel products 
from the Czech Republic); DISPUTE DS297 (2003; Hungary complainant, Croatia respondent; 
consultations requested, no panel established nor settlement notified; measures affecting imports of live 
animals and meat products from Hungary); DISPUTE DS289 (2003; Poland complainant, Czech Republic 
respondent; consultations requested, no panel established nor settlement notified; additional duty on 
Imports of pig meat from Poland). 
   30 
CEFTA 2006 significantly amended the original 1992 treaty by modifying the 
rules  related  to  consultation,  by  establishing  a  new  quasi-adjudicative  DRM,  and  by 
providing detailed rules of procedure for the new arbitral tribunal. It is possible to say 
that these changes are the result of two factors. First, as previously mentioned, the EU has 
been the driving force behind the establishment of CEFTA and its facilitator, and the 
CEFTA provisions were drafted to comply with the EC Treaty and the bilateral SAAs 
concluded between the EU and each member of CEFTA as a means of ensuring that the 
member countries would meet their obligations under the SAP and SAAs and would be 
ready for EU membership. Accordingly, CEFTA’s DRM provisions are similar to those 
that the EU has used since 2000 in its FTAs with third countries and are more in line with 
WTO  practice.  The  second  factor  leading  to  the  implementation  of  changes  in  the 
CEFTA DRM procedures was the need to ensure that trade disputes between countries 
that were not used to cooperating with each other would be resolved efficiently and that 
awards made in those disputes would be final, binding and enforceable.    
As  already  mentioned,  in  case  of  a  dispute,  the  parties  are  first  expected  to 
cooperate and try to resolve the dispute through direct consultations or consultations in 
the  Joint  Committee
105.  The  new  CEFTA  strengthened  the  earlier  political  model  of 
dispute  settlement  by  requiring  the  parties’s  direct  consultations  to  take  place  in  the 
presence of a mediator
106, who would submit a final report to the Joint Committee. The 
rules on the appointment of a mediator are set out in Annex 8 of CEFTA 2006. It is 
                                                 
105 CEFTA 2006 Article 42(1)(2).  
106 Article 42(3): “These consultation may take place, should the Parties concerned so agree, in the 
presence of a mediator. If the Parties concerned do not agree on a mediator, the Chairman of the Joint 
Committee or, if he is a national or resident of one of the Parties concerned, then the first of his 
predecessors who is not, shall appoint the mediator within 20 calendar days of receipt of the initial written 
request for mediation in accordance with the rules set out in Annex 8…”   31 
noteworthy that Annex 8 provides the UNCITRAL rules on conciliation to apply to the 
mediation  proceedings.
107  If  the  parties  fail  to  reach  agreement  regarding  the  dispute 
through bilateral consultations and mediation, or through the Joint Committee, then they 
have  the  right  to  submit  the  dispute  to  an  arbitral  tribunal
108  for  a  final  and  binding 
resolution.
 109   
At  present,  any  dispute  between  CEFTA  members  arising  out  of  competition 
issues and any dispute in which only one of the parties is also a WTO member has to be 
resolved  by  the  CEFTA  DRM.
110  The  issue  of  concurrent  jurisdiction  between  the 
CEFTA  tribunal  and  the  WTO  DSU  will  become  more  significant  when  all  CEFTA 
members  become  the  WTO  members.
111  The  matter  has  been  addressed  in  CEFTA 
Article  43(4).  The  said  article  which  states  that  a  “dispute  under  consultation  and 
arbitration  under  this  Agreement  shall  not  be  submitted  to  the  WTO  for  dispute 
settlement [n]or shall an issue already before the WTO DSU be submitted for arbitration 
under this article.” This solution has clearly been inspired by EU-Mexico and the EU-
Chile  FTAs.  An  equally  interesting  issue  is  that  of  the  substantive  law  that  CEFTA 
arbitrators have to apply in dispute resolution. Clearly, if no WTO rules and disciplines 
                                                 
107 Annex 8, Article 1. Annex 8 is available online at Stability Pact web site 
http://www.stabilitypact.org/trade/Annexes%208%20%20Appointment%20of%20a%20mediator%20FINA
L.pdf (last accessed on April 22, 2007). 
108 Article 43(1): “Disputes between the Parties.... may be referred to arbitration by any Party to the dispute 
by means of a written notification addressed to the other Party to the dispute…” 
109 Article 43(3). 
110 This is different from the EU-Chile FTA which also excludes competition issues from its scope of 
jurisdiction. 
111 Until 22 April 2007, majority of the Western Balkan countries have become WTO members. Indeed, 
only Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia have not acceded to the WTO. Kosovo has not been 
recognized as an independent country. Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro are currently observes at 
the WTO. See data on membership and observers at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last accessed on April 22, 2007).   32 
apply to the provisions of the FTA that are in dispute (usually because the areas regulated 
by the FTA and the WTO do not overlap) or where the FTA explicitly refers to the WTO, 
or even GATT, the CEFTA tribunal will apply CEFTA rules. However, the situation is 
more complex when the areas of regulation of the FTA and the WTO do overlap and 
where the WTO remedies are different from those provided for in the FTA. It is possible 
to see that the CEFTA tribunal could use the WTO rules to interpret the provisions of 
CEFTA but not vice versa.  
Another way in which the EU-Chile FTA has influenced CEFTA 2006 is the 
inclusion in the latter of a clause on the admissibility of amicus curiae briefs during 
arbitration proceedings.
112 That allows opinions of third parties to be presented before the 
tribunal and potentially contribute to a better understanding of the issue in disputes and 
thereby influence the tribunal’s decision. 
Annex 9 of CEFTA sets out how its arbitral panels are to be constituted and how 
they will function.
113 It provides that, if the parties fail to agree on the appointment of the 
third arbitrator, that arbitrator would be nominated by the President of the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration at the Hague. This solution is different from those provided for in the 
FTAs between the EU and Mexico and Chile but the purpose is clearly the same—to 
prevent the parties from obstructing the procedure by failing to agree on a panel. It is also 
noteworthy that Annex 9 specifies that the procedural arbitration rules applicable will be 
                                                 
112 CEFTA 2006 Article 43(2). 
113 Annex 9; Constitution and Functioning of the Arbitral Tribunal referred to in Article 43, paragraph 3, 
available online at 
http://www.stabilitypact.org/trade/Annexes%20%209%20Constitution%20and%20Functioning%20of%20t
he%20Arbitral%20Tribunal%20FINAL.pdf (last accessed on April 29, 2007).   33 
the Optional Rules for Arbitrating Disputes Between Two States of the Permanent Court 
of Arbitration at the Hague. 
In summary, it is possible to say that CEFTA  2006 follows the general trend 
already observed towards judicialization of the EU’s DRMs.  The original treaty included 
a DRM that was somewhat limited by CEFTA’s transitional nature and restricted scope 
of an international treaty, and was generally not expected to be very effective. However, 
CEFTA’s  scope has changed with the accession of the Western Balkan countries to the 
treaty. Because not all of those countries were members of the WTO, it was not possible 
to  rely,  as  had  been  done  before,  on  that  agreement’s  much  more  structured  and 
enforceable mechanism to be utilized for the settlement of CEFTA disputes. CEFTA 
2006 therefore includes certain DRM provisions that have been tailored in accordance 
with  its  specific  nature,  providing  more  detailed  substantive  and  procedural  rules, 
independent from the WTO.  
 
Conclusions 
DRMs  provide  an  authentic  uniform  source  of  interpretation  of  the  rules  and 
norms  of  the  international  treaties  that  establish  FTAs  (and  RTAs  in  general).  They 
facilitate consistent compliance with the treaties and thus enhance the legitimacy of the 
FTAs  and  their  legal  rules.  DRMs  are  therefore  an  important  tool  to  increase  the 
likelihood that an integration will be successfully implemented and will be permanent.  
I have stated earlier in this article that it is possible to discern two trends in the 
evolution of international trade dispute settlement—the increasing juridicialization of the 
DRM  and  the  establishment  of  compulsory  rather  than  consultative  jurisdiction  of   34 
international tribunals. As analyzed in this article, the development of CEFTA and other 
FTAs  concluded  between  the  EU  and  third  countries  over  the  last  decade  seems  to 
confirm these tendencies.  
In  the  previous  sections  of  this  paper  it  has  been  suggested  that  the  level  of 
political  commitment  to  regionalism  varies  from  state  to  state  according  to  whatever 
“actual or perceived conflict between national and regional objectives”
114 there might be. 
In the case of the EEA, for example, it seems that the EU and the EFTA countries have 
the ambition to achieve deep economic integration and thus the DRM provisions in that 
treaty, at least since the 2001 Vaduz Convention, are detailed, include not only parties’ 
direct consultation and consultation within the EEA Joint Committee but also classical 
arbitration and the right of the parties to place dispute before the ECJ itself.
115 It has been 
shown how the broader scope of the new CEFTA and the anticipation by the EU and the 
rest of the international community that, for historical reasons, the new CEFTA members 
from the Western Balkans would lack a commitment to co-operate and integrated, have 
influenced how CEFTA institutional scope and DRM have developed, drawing the DRM 
away from the political and quasi-adjudicative models preferred by the EU towards the 
more juridicialized WTO model. As the jurisdiction of the WTO bodies and of regional 
courts and tribunals broaden, it seems that the possibility of overlapping and conflicting 
                                                 
114 F. Rueda-Junquera, “European Integration Model: Lessons for the Central American Common Market”, 
The Jean Monnet Chair lecture, February 2006, University of Miami, Florida (on file with the author) at 13. 
115 Agreement on the EEA Article 11(2). See more on the reference to the ECJ in EEA in A. R. Ziegler, 
“The EFTA Experience” in L. Bartels & F. Ortino, Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO System, 
supra note 15 at 409-411 and E.R. Robles, “Political & Quasi-Adjudicative Dispute Settlement Models in 
European Union Free Trade Agreements”, supra note 9 at 12-13. Note that the Ankara Agreement, or the 
association agreement signed between the EEC and Turkey (OJ L361/3, 31/12/1977) provides in Article 
25(2) a similar solution with respect to reference to the ECJ or any other court or tribunal (but without 
provisions on arbitration proceedings; arbitration was included later in 1995 Decision re Customs Union 
between Turkey and the European Community, Articles 61-61).     35 
jurisdictions increases.  Given the fact that CEFTA  focuses primarily  on trade  among 
member states that are either already WTO members or soon will be, it will be interesting 
to see how workable the CEFTA provision on the mutual exclusivity of proceedings 
before the WTO and CEFTA tribunals turns out to be. However, it seems that the more 
robust dispute settlement clauses of the modified CEFTA are intended to provide better 
support of the integration by improving the effectiveness of dispute settlement through 
minimizing  reliance  on  national  governments’  political  will  and  commitment  to 
integration and communitarian law. For a treaty of a transitional nature and limited by a 
net of bilateral SAAs, this can be counted as a huge improvement.  